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4 Beyond individual freedom 
and agency: structures of living 
together in the capability approach 
to development 
1 
S E´ V E R I N E  D E N E U L I N  
Introduction 
It was a typical summer evening in Talamanca, a small village in the 
Bri-Bri indigenous reserve in the south of Costa Rica, near the 
Panamanian border. I had the privilege of accompanying a group of 
lawyers from the Costa Rican Court of Justice who were working on a 
popular education project about the Costa Rican constitution. On that 
evening, some indigenous people met with us in the well-lighted educa­
tion centre of the village in order to tell us some stories of their lives. 
With the musical background of animal life in the surrounding equa­
torial forest, an elderly farmer told us how a primary school had been 
created in the village in the 1950s. He also shared his experience of 
how, after falling seriously ill in the 1970s, he was taken by helicopter 
to the nearby city where he received free medical treatment and how, 
after remaining for many weeks in hospital without any result, he was 
cured by going to see the traditional healer of his indigenous commu­
nity. A young indigenous lady reported how she received support from 
the Costa Rican state university in her efforts to translate the Bri-Bri 
language into written form, as well as to write the legends and tradi­
tions of her people. The young lady’s ten-year-old boy proudly taught 
us how to breed iguanas (after school, the young boy was helping 
his family in their iguana breeding farm supported by a government 
programme designed to protect endangered species). As the evening 
1 Department of Economics and International Development, University of Bath, 
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for helpful comments on a preliminary draft. I also thank Jacqueline Garcı´a and 
the family Mora-Ulate for invaluable help during my fieldwork in Costa Rica. 
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unfolded, so did my understanding of Costa Rica’s achievements in 
promoting the capabilities that people have reason to choose and value. 
Costa Rica is a well-known case in development circles of how a 
country with limited economic resources has been able to provide high 
levels of quality of life for its people, or in other words has been able to 
expand the capabilities they have reason to choose and value (Garnier 
et al. 1997; Mesa-Lago 2000a, 2000b). Costa Ricans widely enjoy the 
capability to live long and healthy lives (life expectancy has increased by 
thirty years in half a century and reached seventy-six years in 2000), the 
capability to read and write (the proportion of illiterate people has been 
reduced from 27 per cent in 1940 to 4 per cent in 2000), the capability to 
be healthy (infant mortality rates have decreased from 137 per thousand 
in 1940 to 13 per thousand in 1995, health insurance coverage has 
expanded from 0 per cent in 1940 to 84 per cent in 1990, the coverage 
of basic services is almost complete in both rural and urban areas), and 
the capability to live in a clean and rich natural environment (a large 
surface of the country’s superficies have been declared protected natural 
areas in order to preserve the rich bio-diversity of its forests).2 
The thrust of Sen’s capability approach to development is that devel­
opment be judged ‘in terms of the expansion of substantive human 
freedoms’ (Dre` ze and Sen 2002: 3). These substantive human freedoms 
are ‘seen in the form of individual capabilities to do things that a person 
has reason to value’ (Sen 1999a: 56). Hence, the development of Costa 
Rica is to be assessed in terms of what Costa Ricans are able to do or be, 
such as being able to read and write, to live in a clean environment, to 
live long and healthy lives, or to participate in the life of the commu­
nity. But is it sufficient to assess development achievements in the space 
of individual freedoms or individual capabilities, as is implied by Sen’s 
capability approach to development? 
Although Sen’s capability approach has shifted the informational 
basis of quality of life assessment from income to the capability space, 
this chapter argues that, by placing individual subjects at the centre 
stage of his capability approach, Sen maintains a conceptual tension 
between the individual and his or her society. That tension can survive 
at the theoretical level but cannot be maintained when the capability 
approach to development becomes a guiding theory for development 
2	 Data in this paragraph are taken from CEPAL 2001, Estado de la Nacio´n 2001 
and Garnier et al. 1997. 
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practice. This tension becomes especially unsustainable in three areas. 
First, there is a strong rationale for extending the evaluative space of 
development to non-individual or collective capabilities, and not only 
insofar as they contribute to guaranteeing the capabilities of individual 
subjects. Second, because individual value judgements critically depend 
on a collective framework that gives rise to them and sustains them, 
assessing development in terms of the capabilities that individuals have 
reason to choose and value requires setting the subject of development 
beyond individual subjects. Third, if individual agency is to be central 
in promoting individual capabilities, as it is in Sen’s capability 
approach, then development theory cannot ignore the socio-historical 
conditions that make individual agency possible. In that respect, the 
chapter introduces the notion of socio-historical agency as central in 
the promotion of capabilities. 
Individual freedom in Sen’s capability approach 
By situating the evaluative space of quality of life in the capability space, 
that is in what individuals are able to be or do, Sen’s capability approach 
implies that individuals are to be considered as the very subjects of 
development, both as ends and means of development. Development 
is to be assessed ‘in terms of whether the freedoms that individuals have 
are enhanced’ and development is to be achieved through the ‘free 
agency of individuals’ (Sen 1999a: 4). Speaking of the deep afflictions 
that affect mankind in terms of hunger, malnutrition, preventable dis­
eases, poverty and oppression, Sen underlines the point that ‘we have to 
recognise the role of individual freedoms of different kinds in counter­
ing these afflictions. Indeed, individual agency is, ultimately, central to 
addressing these deprivations’ (Sen 1999a: xii).3 
Even if individual subjects are at the core of development, both as 
the ends and means of development, the capability approach does 
not consider them as detached from the social setting in which indivi­
duals breathe and live. Sen’s capability approach does not separate the 
‘thoughts, choices and actions’ of individual human beings from the 
society in which they live, since individuals are ‘quintessentially social 
creatures’ (Sen 2002: 81). This leads Sen to introduce the notion of 
‘socially dependent individual capabilities’ (Sen 2002: 85), and to assert 
3 Italics added. 
107 
//FS2/CUP/3-PAGINATION/CQC/2-PROOFS/3B2/9780521862875C04.3D 107 [104–123] 3.10.2007 5:52PM 
Beyond individual freedom and agency 
that the freedom and agency that each individual enjoys are ‘inescapably 
qualified and constrained by the social, political and economic oppor­
tunities that are available to us’ (Sen 1999a: xii). Individual freedoms are 
inescapably linked to the existence of social arrangements, and ‘our 
opportunities and prospects depend crucially on what institutions exist 
and how they function’ (Sen 1999a:142). 
Institutions or societal arrangements are of central importance for 
promoting the freedoms of individuals. For example, the capability of 
Costa Ricans to be healthy is crucially dependent on the existence of 
key welfare institutions. The capability of Costa Ricans to live in a 
clean environment is deeply connected to the collective belief that bio­
diversity cannot be forsaken for economic interests, and to the exis­
tence of a legal and enforcement framework reflecting that collective 
belief. Equally, the capability of indigenous people to maintain their 
language and traditions cannot be made possible without an adequate 
legal framework that fully protects and implements the rights of cul­
tural minorities. This is why, in Sen’s capability approach to develop­
ment, individual freedom is ‘quintessentially a social product’, because 
‘there is a two-way relation between (1) social arrangements [such as 
economic, social and political opportunities] to expand individual 
freedoms and (2) the use of individual freedoms . . . to make the social 
arrangements more appropriate and effective’ (Sen 1999a: 31). 
Development and the expansion of freedoms cannot occur without 
the presence of key institutions such as the market, public services, 
the judiciary, political parties, the media, etc. As Sen puts it, such ‘a 
freedom-centred view [of development] calls for an institutionally 
integrated approach’ (Dre` ze and Sen 2002: 20). 
Despite the crucial role of social arrangements in the construction of 
individual freedoms themselves, Sen is very reluctant to approach 
development with a supra-individual subject. Even if social arrange­
ments or institutions are seen as very important elements in enhancing 
or impeding individual freedoms, they are still to be ‘investigated in 
terms of their contribution to enhancing and guaranteeing the substan­
tive freedoms of individuals’ (Sen 1999a: xiii). Institutions do crucially 
contribute to our freedoms, but ‘their roles can be sensibly evaluated in 
the light of their contributions to our freedom’ (Sen 1999a: 142). Sen 
(2002) underlines that all actions finally bear upon the lives that human 
beings live, lives which are lived only by individuals and not by some 
supra-individual subject. 
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Gore (1997) has developed a forceful critique of Sen’s focus on 
individual capabilities as the informational basis for well-being evalua­
tion and development assessment. He has argued that, like the infor­
mational basis of utility and opulence, ‘functionings and capabilities [in 
Sen’s capability approach] are seen as objects of value which indivi­
duals have [and] which are disembedded from the institutional con­
texts of human activity’ (Gore 1997: 235), and that, hence, Sen’s 
capability approach does not take into account the intrinsic value 
that these institutional contexts have for individual human well­
being. Although the capability approach includes social elements by, 
for example, including social capabilities (such as the capability to 
participate in the life of the community or to appear in public without 
shame), or by insisting on the importance of social arrangements in 
providing the conditions through which individual capabilities will be 
exercised, Gore argues that the capability approach remains individu­
alist because the ‘goodness or badness of social arrangements or states 
of affairs is evaluated on the basis of what is good or bad for individual 
well-being and freedom and [because it] is also reduced to the good of 
those individuals’ (Gore 1997: 242). In agreement with Sen, Gore 
affirms that the evaluation of states of affairs is to be assessed on the 
basis of what is good or bad for individuals, but he objects that the 
valuable constituents of individual human well-being are to be seen in 
terms of individual properties only. Individual lives contain collective 
goods as well, and therefore individual human well-being is also to be 
assessed on the basis of these collective goods. 
Gore bases his argument on Charles Taylor’s concept of ‘irreducibly 
social goods’ (Taylor 1995). Irreducibly social goods are objects of 
value which cannot be decomposed into individual occurrences, or 
expressed in terms of individual characteristics. They cannot be 
reduced to individual acts or choices, since these individual acts or 
choices are understandable only against a background of practices, 
understanding, and meaning. For example, the word ‘beautiful’ can 
be understood, and has a meaning, only against a further background 
of meaning. Women with large hips were once upon a time considered 
as the standard of beauty, while in other contexts only slim women 
could qualify as being beautiful. Without the irreducibly social good of 
a language code and cultural practices, an individual uttering the word 
‘beautiful’ would be incomprehensible. Among these irreducibly social 
goods, one finds, for example, language codes, institutional norms, 
109 
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aesthetic values, ethnic belonging, and cultural or political practices 
inherent in a given society.4 According to Gore, the capability approach 
critically fails to recognise the intrinsic value of these irreducibly social 
goods, and incorporates them only to the extent to which they affect 
individual properties. Although irreducibly social goods remain com­
ponents of individual lives, because these goods have an intrinsic 
value to human well-being, the informational basis of development, 
Gore argues, needs to go beyond individual capabilities and incorpo­
rate these. 
Sen has strongly rejected the critique advanced by Gore, and asserts 
that his capability approach does indeed include the intrinsic impor­
tance and value of irreducibly social goods in the evaluation of indivi­
dual well-being. For example, the capability approach considers 
democratic freedom, or the ability to take part in and to influence the 
decisions that affect the life of the community, as a good that cannot be 
reduced to individual characteristics and that has its locus in the society 
itself. Sen stresses that democratic freedom is ‘a significant ingredient – 
a critically important component – of individual capabilities’ (Sen 
2002: 79). Thus, the level of democracy that characterises a society is 
an irreducibly social good that fully enters as an ingredient in indivi­
dual human well-being. However, the importance and value of demo­
cratic freedom are relevant only to the extent that it enters as a 
component of individual human well-being, to the extent that it 
makes the lives of individuals better. There remains a strong rationale 
for including irreducibly social goods in the informational basis of 
development for reasons that go beyond their intrinsic value to the 
lives of individuals. 
4	 Taylor (1995) strongly distinguishes the notion of irreducibly social goods from 
the economic conception of public goods. Like public goods (such as national 
defence or a dam), irreducibly social goods cannot be secured for one person 
without being secured for a whole group, but the goods that public goods are 
producing are the goods of individuals. Taylor gives the examples of a dam and a 
culture. The dam itself is not good, only its effects are, and its effects are good to 
individuals. In contrast, an irreducibly social good like a culture cannot be 
instrumentally valuable to individual goods like a dam would be. Irreducibly 
social goods cannot be judged through their effects, and are not instrumental to a 
purpose they serve. A valuable culture, unlike the dam is an irreducible feature of 
society as a whole, while the dam is only an instrument and not a feature of society 
at all. 
//FS2/CUP/3-PAGINATION/CQC/2-PROOFS/3B2/9780521862875C04.3D 110 [104–123] 3.10.2007 5:52PM 
110 The Capability Approach 
Structures of living together 
It may appear to be a contradiction that a good can at the same time be 
an irreducibly social good, that is, a good irreducible to any individual 
component or characteristic, and remain a component of individual 
lives. Yet this contradiction constitutes the definitional core of irredu­
cibly social goods: they exist beyond individuals but owe their exis­
tence to them. Irreducibly social goods could not exist without being 
endorsed by individuals, since anything that happens does so because 
individuals make it happen. For example, a language would not exist if 
individuals had never spoken it, a social norm would not exist if 
individuals did not endorse that norm in regulating their actions, a 
particular form of ethnicity would not exist if individuals did not bear 
the characteristic feature of that ethnicity, etc. But the fact that irredu­
cibly social goods exist only when supported by individuals does not 
imply that they do not have an existence well beyond individual actions 
and decisions. For example, although a football team cannot exist 
without its constitutive elements and cannot win a match without the 
participation of its players, the football match cannot be reduced to the 
actions of its players, and the value of the actions of a football team is 
greater than the value of the actions of its individual members taken 
separately. 
In order to maintain the interconnection between individual actions 
and irreducibly social goods, the notion of ‘structures of living 
together’, introduced by the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, appears, 
in my opinion, more appropriate in the context of development to refer 
to the reality of irreducibly social goods. Structures of living together 
can be defined as structures which belong to a particular historical 
community, which provide the conditions for individual lives to flour­
ish, and which are irreducible to interpersonal relations and yet bound 
up with these.5 Unlike the notion of irreducibly social goods, the notion 
of structures of living together directly suggests that irreducibly social 
goods emerge from the fact that individuals are living together, and 
that this fact constitutes the very condition under which individual 
5 Paul Ricoeur’s original definition refers to the notion of institution: ‘By 
institution, we understand the structure of living together as this belongs to a 
historical community, a structure irreducible to interpersonal relations and yet 
bound up with these.’ (Ricoeur 1992: 194). 
111 
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human lives may flourish. But the basic idea is the same. Although 
sustained by individual components, these structures of living together 
have an autonomous existence and cannot be reduced to the features of 
the individuals living in these structures. Referring again to the exam­
ple of the term ‘beautiful’, the word has a meaning only against a 
structure of living together, namely a language. Although a language 
and its meaning depend on individuals speaking that language and 
endorsing its meaning, the language has an existence beyond indivi­
duals. No individual word would be understood if that structure of 
living together did not exist. Even apparently individual properties 
such as personal autonomy cannot exist without certain structures of 
living together that support personal autonomy (see Raz 1986: 204–6). 
As Charles Taylor (1995: 135–6) summarises it: ‘In one sense, perhaps, 
all acts and choices are individual. They are, however, only the acts and 
choices they are against the background of practices and understand­
ings. But this langue cannot be reduced to a set of acts, choices, or 
indeed other predicates of individuals. Its locus is a society.’ 
It must be noted that, as structures emerge from human beings living 
together in a particular community, these structures need not always be 
oriented towards the good living of society. Structures of living 
together can have a negative effect upon the good living of its members, 
such as structures of inequalities and oppression caused by an unequal 
distribution of power. All these are features of a society upon which an 
individual has little control but which, nonetheless, constrain or pro­
mote his or her actions. 
I began this chapter with a brief assessment of Costa Rica’s success in 
the light of Sen’s capability approach to development. Examining the 
reasons for Costa Rica’s development success illustrates how ignoring 
structures of living together in the assessment of development misses 
out a crucial aspect of development. 
The reasons that the human development literature has often 
advanced to explain a country’s success in achieving high levels of 
capabilities are mainly the scope and nature of the public spending in 
key areas, such as health and education (see for example Ghai 2000; 
Stewart et al. 2000). Costa Rica has obviously fared very well in having 
adequate public action oriented towards the expansion of individual 
capabilities. It has the highest social spending ratio in Latin America, it 
has social services accessible to the whole population in both rural and 
urban areas alike, and it has a strong emphasis on primary health 
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services and primary education (Mesa-Largo 2000b). Yet, this public 
action has not emerged from a vacuum. 
While Sen has often emphasised that the degree of democratic free­
dom is central in understanding the social development path of coun­
tries (see Alkire 2002: 129–143; Sen 1999b), he does not explore the 
reasons why some democratic countries are more able than others to 
take the necessary public action to promote individual capabilities.6 
This chapter argues that, beyond democratic freedom, it is the exis­
tence of certain structures of living together which explains the suc­
cesses and failures of countries to promote the capabilities that people 
have reason to choose and value. 
For example, the various individual capabilities of the inhabitants of 
the Costa Rican village described in the introduction exist only through 
a multiplicity of certain structures of living together that have been 
built up throughout Costa Rica’s history.7 The capability of the inha­
bitants of the village to read and write has its roots in the certain 
productive and social structure that was characteristic of Costa Rica 
at the end of the nineteenth century. This led the government, guided by 
a liberal elite, to take the decision to impose universal primary educa­
tion for boys and girls, in rural and urban areas alike (Mesa-Lago 
2000a). The poor economic conditions of the country, and the egali­
tarian character of its productive structure, together with a certain 
motivational structure of the political elite of the time, allowed this 
irrevocable decision to be taken without much opposition from the 
economic elite (IADB 1994).8 Similarly, the capability of the inhabi­
tants of the village to enjoy efficient health services is due to the social 
6	 For example, after Costa Rica and Uruguay, Colombia is the third Latin 
American country that has the most long-standing democracy. Yet, the exercise of 
democratic freedom in Columbia has not led to the same level of social 
achievements one could find in other Latin American countries, even those that 
have known long periods of dictatorships such as Argentina (see Whitehead 
2002). 
7	 A more detailed description of the reasons behind Costa Rica’s development can 
be found in Deneulin 2005. 
8	 It is precisely because of this particular structure of the elite, which did not have to 
assess its power on the military, that Costa Rica was able to take the decision to 
suppress its army in 1948. The abolition of the army, far from being a deliberate 
decision to generate more resources towards social areas, has to be seen within the 
background of the particular structures of living together that characterised Costa 
Rica. A similar decision in other countries would have been impossible (see, for 
example, Torres 2001). 
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and power structure of Costa Rica and the motivational structures that 
have inhabited certain leaders at key moments. 
The Costa Rican social security system and the provision for uni­
versal health services that emerged at the beginning of the 1940s were 
the results of the actions of a particular leader (Caldero´n) who had the 
vision to introduce a social security scheme. Caldero´n was able to carry 
out his vision through a key alliance with the communists which 
enabled him to overcome the opposition of a small economic elite 
(Wilson 1998). These two decisions, for universal primary education 
and social security, emerged from the particular motivational and 
power structures of the Costa Rican society, and opened the path for 
an even more powerful structure of living together in promoting cap­
abilities, that of a society whose identity is built on its welfare institu­
tions. This social democratic identity has led to the progressive 
development of complex welfare institutions guaranteeing the condi­
tions for Costa Ricans to exercise key valuable capabilities. (For a 
description of the evolution of welfare institutions in Costa Rica, see 
Mesa-Largo 2000a, 2000b; Seligson et al. 1997.) Such identity acts as a 
strong collective capability that belongs to the Costa Rican society as a 
whole beyond individual reach and control, and explains the high 
levels of human well-being that Costa Ricans enjoy. 
In the light of the Costa Rican development path, assessing develop­
ment on the basis of individual capabilities, or irreducibly social goods 
that are of intrinsic value to individual lives such as the capability to 
maintain one’s language and culture or the capability to participate in 
the political life, would miss out an important component of the 
development process itself. It would miss out certain structures of 
living together that make the whole process of development and expan­
sion of individual capabilities possible. 
Although Gore’s critique was directed at underlining the need to 
include structures of living together as components of individual 
human well-being, he did not address Sen’s view that states of affairs 
should be evaluated only according to their goodness or badness for 
individuals. This position, known as ethical individualism (Robeyns 
2000), holds that, when evaluating states of affairs, the effects of states 
of affairs on individuals are what matters, and therefore individual 
subjects are to be the unit of moral concern. It hence suffices to evaluate 
structures of living together by looking at their effects, positive or 
negative, upon individual features such as individual freedoms. 
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Examining the reasons why individual Costa Ricans enjoy high levels 
of human freedoms inclines us to conclude that the reality of develop­
ment is not well captured by ethical individualism, insofar as ethical 
individualism leads to an excessive focus on existing individual lives, 
and directs attention away from the examination of the structures of 
living together and the historical explications of these structures, which 
are not only responsible for the conditions of life of individuals today 
but have also affected past generations and will affect future ones. 
Structures of living together are thus not only to be assessed because 
they are good for individuals, but also according to whether they pro­
mote the collective structures which help individuals to flourish. Beyond 
the individual capabilities of Costa Ricans to read and write, to live long 
and healthy lives, to live in a non-polluted environment, to enjoy high 
levels of democratic freedom, there are collective capabilities which 
belong to the Costa Rican society (and not to individual Costa Ricans), 
and in part constitute the conditions of existence of individual capabil­
ities. Because structures of living together belong to a social group of 
which individuals are members, development cannot be assessed only in 
terms of whether the freedoms of the individual members of that social 
group have been enhanced, but has also to be assessed in terms of 
whether the (collective) freedoms of that social group or collectivity to 
promote individual freedoms have been enhanced. 
One could object that assessing collective structures according to 
whether they generate collective structures which themselves lead to 
individual flourishing is still instrumental to individual human well­
being. It still ultimately judges development by individuals’ lives, and 
hence such a position is still ethically individualistic, since ultimately 
the evaluation of states of affairs depends on their effects upon the lives 
of individuals. However, although this position still appears instru­
mental and judges states of affairs according to their effects upon 
individuals, because this position acknowledges that structures of liv­
ing together constitute the condition of existence of individual lives, 
this position goes beyond ethical individualism. Individuals are not the 
only unit of moral concern. Structures of living together are units of 
moral concern too. Failing to include them explicitly in the evaluation 
of states of affairs leads to the loss of important information for 
development. 
Sen’s thinking seems to have recently evolved in that direction, 
moving away from an ethically individualistic approach. In response 
115 
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to critiques accusing his capability approach of focusing ‘on individuals 
and their relation to an overall social context, and not on collectivities’ 
(Evans 2002: 56), Sen seems to have incorporated these critiques into 
his thinking and moved away from the language of individual capabil­
ities. He now asserts that there do indeed exist capabilities that belong 
to collectivities and that can only with difficulty be reduced to indivi­
dual capabilities: ‘There are genuine collective capabilities such as the 
capability of a world nuclear power to kill the entire population of the 
world though nuclear bombing. Similarly, the capability of Hutu acti­
vists to decimate the Tutsis is a collective capability since the ability to 
do this is not a part of any individual Hutu’s life (interdependent as it 
is). There could be also more positive collective capabilities such as the 
capability of humanity as a whole to cut child mortality drastically’ 
(Sen 2002: 85).9 
Does Sen’s capability approach now contain an insoluble contra­
diction? Can it affirm the importance and value of collective capabil­
ities, while also affirming the importance and value of ‘socially 
dependent individual capabilities’ (Sen 2002: 81) which, Sen insists, 
‘have to be distinguished from what are genuinely ‘‘collective capabil­
ities’’ (Sen 2002: 85)’? It seems difficult to understand why Sen’s cap­
ability approach should rest on the evaluation of states of affairs in 
terms of whether the freedoms of (socially interdependent) individuals 
have been enhanced, and not in terms of whether the freedoms of the 
collective wholes in which individuals live (such as the freedom of the 
Hutus not to kill Tutsis) have been enhanced. 
If the capability approach is to say something about the success of 
development policies in bringing about certain outcomes, the informa­
tional basis for assessing development cannot only remain at the level 
of its individual outcomes but has also to include the (collective) 
processes that are responsible for these outcomes, such as, for example, 
the power structure of a particular country, its existing social norms, its 
particular national identity, or its particular political and democratic 
history. Structures of living together, by the very fact of transcending 
individual human actions, need to be identified, because they are 
properties of a collectivity rather than a property of individuals, and 
these collective capabilities provide the conditions for individual lives 
to flourish. In addition to the distinction between valuable capabilities 
9 Italics are mine. 
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(such as the capability to be healthy) and non-valuable capabilities 
(such as the capability to commit homicide), one would need to distin­
guish valuable from non-valuable structures of living together, or what 
Sen has now called collective capabilities that made these individual 
capabilities possible (such as the valuable collective capability of era­
dicating child mortality, or the negative collective capability of an 
ethnic group to kill another ethnic group). Moreover, because indivi­
dual lives and choices are so affected by structures of living together, 
one cannot assume that their choices, including what they value, are 
independent of these structures. I now turn to this point that will 
further point towards the need to pay explicit attention to collective 
capabilities. 
Meaning and values 
Sen’s capability approach does of course recognise this deep entangle­
ment between choices and structures. For example, the capability to 
move around in a particular society strongly depends upon the presence 
of public transport, the availability of road infrastructures and the 
degree of peace in that society. If someone possesses a bike, he will be 
less able to exercise his capability to move around in a society where 
civil war rages and where roads have not been maintained than a 
person who would similarly choose to move around in a peaceful 
Western European country (Robeyns 2000: 17). But if the latter person 
has witnessed a terrible traffic accident involving a cyclist, and subse­
quently is psychologically unable to ride a bicycle again, could one 
conclude that that person freely chose not to ride a bike? Nussbaum 
(2000: 88) notes in the context of the capability for play and leisure that 
people should be free to lead a workaholic life should they choose to do 
so. But one might wonder to what extent a young professional who 
apparently freely chooses a workaholic life has really made a free 
decision and not a constrained decision given the work culture of her 
society. The capability approach seems to pay little attention to how 
the capability to make free choices should be treated, beyond the 
provision of adequate information. 
As these examples show, the capability approach needs to be able to 
distinguish to what extent one is free to exercise a certain capability and 
to what extent this choice is constrained by social norms. But the 
capability approach does not seem to offer a framework to evaluate 
117 
//FS2/CUP/3-PAGINATION/CQC/2-PROOFS/3B2/9780521862875C04.3D 117 [104–123] 3.10.2007 5:52PM 
Beyond individual freedom and agency 
whether people have the capability to make free choices. Nussbaum 
(2000: 82) has emphasised that the capability for practical reason is a 
pre-condition for the exercise of freedom, but the problem is that one 
needs to be free in order to be able to access practical reason, and if 
practical reason is what is thought to enhance freedom, the approach 
ends up in a circle. If women, when offered literacy classes, refuse to 
make use of the opportunities after having been offered all the adequate 
information regarding the value of them attending the classes, can one 
conclude that they have the capability for knowledge? 
Sen has written extensively about the deformation of preferences and 
how these could be socially deformed, but capabilities could be socially 
conditioned and equally severely deformed, even after providing ade­
quate information concerning the wrongness of the choices. Is it a 
matter of accepting, then, that there is no such thing as free choice 
and acknowledging that all choices are, ultimately, socially condi­
tioned? Perhaps it would suffice to answer that question by simply 
acknowledging that what is considered as meaningful and worthy of 
choice can be understood only against a background of community and 
history, and that free choice and value judgement are themselves to be 
understood as being made on the basis of certain internalised beliefs 
inherent in the specific structures of living together in which individuals 
live. So it is not a question of identifying those whose capabilities have 
been deformed as against ‘free’ individuals, but of accepting that all are 
subject to restraints and conditioning which affect how they exercise 
choices. 
Somewhat independently of his capability approach, Sen (1985: 
183) has discussed how meanings are dependent on social contexts, 
and that moral valuation depends on one’s position. States of affairs 
(and hence capabilities) are thus always evaluated where the person 
situates himself. Yet he argues that this does not entail that moral 
evaluation is necessary relative. There are choices that can be consid­
ered as non-meaningful and even wrong. Sen writes: ‘The positionality 
of moral valuation is perfectly consistent with objectivity of moral 
values. Moral valuation can be position-relative in the same way as 
such statements as ‘‘The sun is setting’’. The truth of that statement 
varies with the position of the person, but it cannot vary from person to 
person among those standing in the same position’ (Sen 1985: 183–4). 
But if all of us, standing in the same position, value the same objectives, 
can we say with confidence, in an unchangeable way, that our choices 
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are morally (and objectively) valuable? If, for example, all poor and 
marginalised people who live beside an elite driven by status symbols, 
or who are daily invaded by consumerist ways of life through the 
media, value the capability for self-expression (by buying a cellular 
phone) rather than the capability to be adequately nourished, can that 
value judgement be accepted because it is shared among all people in 
the same position? 
As Peter Evans (2002: 58) underlines, the capability approach does 
not seem to ‘explore the ways in which influences on ‘‘mental condi­
tioning’’ might systematically reflect the interests of those with greater 
economic clout and political power’. And Evans pursues: ‘Sen 
acknowledges that the ‘‘sun does not set on the empire of Coca-Cola 
or MTV’’, but he does not explore the implications of these kingdoms 
for the ability of people to choose the kind of lives they ‘‘have reason 
to value’’.’ The capabilities that people value respond to many forces, 
including global ones, over which individuals have no control. Rarely, 
if ever, do people have freedom to decide whether these global forces or 
new structures (norms) through which they frame their value judge­
ments (such as, for example, consumerism) are valuable or not. How, 
then, can one judge, for example, the underlying social concerns of a 
society, as exemplified in consumerism, through which people will 
choose certain valuable capabilities? 
In Sen’s capability approach to development, the privileged structure 
through which people make their value judgements is through demo­
cratic deliberation. Citing Sen’s example of an indigenous community 
which has to choose between ‘a traditional way of life’ and the ‘escape 
of grinding poverty’ (Sen 1999a: 31), UNESCO’s World Culture 
Report quickly adds that, in today’s structures of inequality, one may 
wonder what margins people have for ‘free’ decisions (UNESCO 2000: 
34). There are indeed structures of inequalities and power that leave 
indigenous communities with little choice other than that of ‘choosing’ a 
modern way of life, or structures of inequalities and power that leave 
countries with little option other than that of ‘choosing’, or rather 
accepting, through democratic deliberation, to pursue development 
through the privatisation of public services. The capability approach to 
development would require an evaluation of the different structures that 
lead individuals or collectivities to endorse certain values rather than 
others. The next section examines a final rationale for explicitly includ­
ing structures of living together in the informational basis of quality life. 
119 
//FS2/CUP/3-PAGINATION/CQC/2-PROOFS/3B2/9780521862875C04.3D 119 [104–123] 3.10.2007 5:52PM 
Beyond individual freedom and agency 
Individual agency and its socio-historical conditions 
Political philosophers gathered under the label ‘communitarian philo­
sophers’ (Mulhall and Swift 1992) have long discussed how human 
agency and freedom cannot be thought of independently of structures 
of living together. They argue that the latter actually form an integral 
part of the constitution of the self. They insist that freedom and the 
capacity for choice are not given, but have to be developed. Before 
being an agent endowed with the capability to make autonomous 
choices, a self has to be developed, and this cannot be done without a 
community, without the relationships one makes with other persons. 
Community is pre-existent to individuals. It is what gives meaning to 
the life of its members and gives them identity, in the sense that it is only 
from their attachment to communities that human beings draw their 
moral development, their identity, and the meaning of their life. 
Agency is not a tabula rasa, but is itself the product of certain 
structures of living together. Insofar as human beings have the power 
to understand themselves, to interpret what they are and what they do, 
‘the languages needed for such self-interpretation are essentially social, 
and community is a structural precondition of human agency’ (Mulhall 
and Swift 1992: 162). For example, a woman who is forced into an 
arranged marriage often does not have the agency to protest and rebel 
because the structures of living together that surround her do not 
provide the preconditions for her to do so. She will find her agency 
and ability to choose not to enter an arranged marriage only provided 
that, for example, the education she received at school, or government 
campaigns for gender equity and dignity, have given her the necessary 
critical skills to question the established order. In other words, she will 
have the individual agency to avoid arranged marriage only provided 
that she receives enough collective support to pursue her choice. 
Exercising one’s freedom of choice, like the freedom to marry the 
partner one wishes, will require collective action to change the struc­
tures and transform them into structures enabling individual human 
beings to acquire agency and exercise choice. 
Referring to the example in the introduction, although writing an 
oral indigenous language to prevent its loss crucially depends on the 
individual action and agency of one young lady (in that sense, Sen is 
right in affirming that individual agency and action are crucial in 
addressing deprivations), her action is made possible only through 
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the quality of education that she herself received at school and through 
the support that she encounters with academic institutions that are 
willing to support her efforts. Only certain structures of living together 
can give rise to and can sustain her individual agency and actions to 
preserve the indigenous language. As Evans (2002: 56) points out: ‘In 
practice, my ability to choose the life I have reason to value often hangs 
on the possibility of my acting together with others who have reason to 
value similar things. The capability of choosing [and acting] itself may 
be, in essence, a collective rather than an individual capability.’ 
The necessary presence of certain structures of living together which 
make individual agency and action possible is even more obvious when 
those who are choosing and acting are country leaders. For example, 
the decision to introduce a social security scheme in Costa Rica at the 
beginning of the 1940s was made by a single individual, President 
Caldero´n (see Rosenberg 1983). However, even though Caldero´n had 
the necessary individual agency to pass bold social security reforms and 
other unprecedented progressive social reforms (such as a Labour 
Code), he could not have exercised his agency if he had not encountered 
the necessary collective support and necessary structures of living 
together to do so. It was through an alliance between his own elite 
party and the Communist party that the social reforms that would 
shape the future of Costa Rica’s social development were able to be 
implemented (Wilson 1998). Such a collective action would not have 
been made possible two decades later in the Cold War, when a very 
strong anti-communist culture was reigning across the world. 
The choice that individuals are making appears thus to be crucially 
dependent upon the particular socio-historical structures in which they 
find themselves rather than upon a choice that inheres in their inner 
self. As a consequence, it seems that the capability approach to devel­
opment, if its aim is to address deprivations, will have to place not 
individual agency as central to addressing deprivations but rather 
socio-historical agency (what individuals can do in the socio-historical 
reality in which they are living) as central, and this unavoidably entails 
a careful consideration of the particular structures of living together 
that constitute this socio-historical agency.10 
10	 The importance of socio-historical agency in promoting development is further 
explored in Deneulin 2006. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that because structures of living together were 
constitutive of individual capabilities and of people’s value judgements, 
there was a strong rationale to include them explicitly in the informa­
tional basis of quality of life and development. As the Costa Rican case 
study has illustrated, ignoring these implicit structures of living 
together risks hiding an important, if not the most important, factor 
of development and the removal of human deprivations. Had the 
particular structures of living together of Costa Rica been different, 
the country’s social development would probably be very similar 
nowadays to that of its Central American neighbours. 
The chapter has also argued that structures of living together were 
constitutive of individual agency and that central to addressing depriva­
tions was not as much individual agency as the particular structures that 
build such agency, what I have called the socio-historical agency. Again, 
as the Costa Rican case study has illustrated, although its social devel­
opment is due to key individual actions, these actions would not have 
been possible without certain implicit structures of living together. 
Development is not only a matter of promoting the freedoms that 
individuals have and that they have reason to choose and value, but, 
because the subject of development is at the same time both individual 
and collective, is also a matter of promoting the freedoms that collec­
tivities have and that are worthwhile for the collectivity as such. 
Therefore, drawing up a ‘list’ of valuable structures of living together 
that build up a country’s necessary socio-historical agency to promote 
development, in parallel with Nussbaum’s list of valuable capabilities 
(Nussbaum 2000: 75–77), would be a legitimate route that could 
be taken. 
If development is about enhancing the quality of life of human 
beings, then it cannot ignore that such a human life is a life whose 
sustenance and meaning can come only through others, to paraphrase 
Aristotle. And it cannot ignore that the good of such a human life is 
brought about neither by the mere collections of private or individual 
actions, nor by the proper action of a collective subject which sacrifices 
the parts to itself. It has to acknowledge that the good of humans is 
brought about by an action that is common to both the collective and 
individuals into which it flows back, and which, in turn, must rely on it, 
to paraphrase Jacques Maritain. 
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